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Introduction 
In discussing bond markets in Asia, academics and policymakers typically begin by noting 
that the Asian crisis of 1997-98 in part resulted from the underdevelopment of the region’s 
domestic bond markets and the resultant currency and duration mismatches. When 
assessing the progress made in developing these markets in the post-crisis years, 
academics and policymakers usually observe that, while several domestic currency 
government bond markets have moved ahead, corporate bond markets have lagged (Asian 
Development Bank (2002), Reserve Bank of Australia (2003)). The policy conclusion is 
therefore often drawn: to prevent another Asian crisis, Asian bond markets must be further 
developed. 
This paper has two objectives, one straightforward and factual, the other more speculative. 
First, we let the data on Asian bond issuance speak for themselves, finding that since 2000, 
primary issuance by Asian corporates in local currency has far eclipsed US dollar-
denominated paper. We conclude that the post-crisis growth of the domestic currency 
corporate market is underappreciated (this section expands on points made in Fernandez 
and Klassen (2003)). We comb through the data on issuance to point out cross-country, 
cross-sector and duration differences, but the overall message is that corporate issuance, 
per se, has grown significantly. Second, looking forward, we argue that the problem of Asia’s 
corporate bond market development will not be one of the supply of domestic currency 
obligations. Rather, it will have more to do with demand: demand side factors that lead to the 
contrast between a liquid US dollar bond market in Asia and the relatively illiquid local 
markets. The difference is a by-product of financial market globalisation generally and is one 
that has drawn investors in Asia towards structured products and away from “plain vanilla” 
local currency issues. 
About the data 
The focus of this paper is on Asian corporate, financial and quasi-sovereign issuance data 
from BondWare, a database compiled by Dealogic, an independent data distributor. The data 
start in 1980 and cover an extensive range: 10,157 individual bond issues by a total of 2,388 
issuers, for a total issuance amount of USD 667 billion. We look at the issuance patterns in 
10 Asian economies excluding Japan - China, India, Indonesia, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China)
1 and Thailand - and focus on the data 
after 1998, when local currency issuance first started to capture the market’s attention. 
Restricting ourselves to this data source when looking at Asian corporate bond issuance 
introduces a bias into our analysis. One of the purposes of BondWare data is to permit the 
ranking of bookrunners (the lead underwriters controlling the distribution of paper) by amount 
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or number of deals underwritten); indeed, the data are effectively provided by the 
bookrunners. For this reason, BondWare only captures those issues that the bookrunner 
wants to advertise. This means that small-sized bonds, reverse inquiries (investor-driven 
deals) under private placement and the like may be underrepresented in our sample. In 
addition, we suspect that BondWare’s historical closeness to the US dollar market and 
developed markets generally skews its coverage away from local currency bond markets. 
This sounds like a serious problem, but in fact this is a bias that serves our purpose well. 
We are interested in documenting the current development of the region’s local currency 
corporate debt market. Issuance that goes unadvertised, is placed directly in a limited 
number of hands, and hence is hidden from the BondWare database is likely similarly to be 
hidden from the wider investor base. The bonds captured in BondWare therefore represent 
the state of internationalised corporate bond issuance - the ideal case. 
For comparable data on government issuance, we use our own data compilation, based on 
the respective national treasuries. Issuance that is the direct result of sterilisation of central 
bank purchases of foreign exchange is excluded (though McCauley (2003) makes interesting 
points about the potential synergies between the two markets). 
Government issuance has led the way for local bond market 
development 
Issuance of local currency government bonds has grown substantially since the Asian crisis 
(Klassen (2004)). Taking two snapshots of issuance, one in 1999 and one in 2003, shows that 
government issuance has grown roughly 40% over that period (Table 1). The amount of 
renminbi-denominated bonds issued by the Chinese government remains the largest in non-
Japan Asia, but considerable increases in issuance have come out of other economies that 
have run substantial fiscal deficits, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, India and Taiwan. 
Korean issuance to refinance financial sector restructuring and for other needs has also risen.  
Table 1 
Government gross bond issuance 
In billions of US dollars 
Country  Local 2003  Local 1999  USD 2003  USD 1999 
China   45.5   48.6   1.0    – 
Hong Kong SAR    1.7    0.8    –    – 
India   31.1   19.6    –    – 
Indonesia   1.4   –  –   – 
Korea   28.8   15.8   1.0    – 
Malaysia    12.6   3.7  –    1.0 
Philippines    17.0   1.5   2.7    3.7 
Singapore  4.9   3.7    –    – 
Taiwan,  China    13.3   8.8  –   – 
Thailand    1.4   10.7  –   – 
Total   157.7   113.2    4.7    4.7 
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These snapshots of government issuance also show that sovereign funding done in US 
dollars has risen. With the exception of the Philippines (which in certain years, such as 1999, 
actually issued more in dollars than it did in pesos), the Asian sovereign financing mix is very 
skewed towards local currency bonds. Sovereign dollar issuance from China and Korea in 
2003 was clearly for benchmarking and profile purposes. 
So, not only have local currency government bond markets grown in size over the past 
several years, but sovereigns in Asia have displayed a clear preference for local currency 
over US dollar funding. The mix between local and foreign funding by sovereigns in Asia over 
the period 1998 to 2003 can be seen in Graph 1. First, there is a group of governments that 
issue exclusively in local currency (Hong Kong, India, Singapore and Taiwan) and another 
group that does so almost exclusively (China, Indonesia and Thailand). In the middle are 
Korea and Malaysia, whose government issuance is still skewed towards local funding, but 
who tend to have a more balanced mix. And, finally, there is the Philippines exception, which 
was referred to above. Finally, we take note of the maturity of government issuance, because 
it will be echoed in the next section on corporate issuance. For governments and quasi-
government entities that issue in both local and foreign currency, their issuance in US dollars 
tends to be further along the yield curve, especially in the Philippines and Malaysia. In the 
case of Thailand, dollar funding, like baht funding, tends to be of short maturity. 
Among the various other characteristics necessary to make government bond markets 
effective is liquidity. McCauley and Remolona (2000) show that, with respect to government 
bond markets, larger size tends to lead to more trading and greater liquidity. When it comes 
to the Asian government bond markets, it seems fair to conclude that size itself is not the 
limiting factor in market development. 
Size matters and Asia has it: domestic corporate bond markets have 
grown considerably 
Before the Asian crisis, the words “liquid” and “internationalised” could not have been used to 
describe any of the corporate, local currency debt markets in non-Japan Asia. The 
BondWare data (recalling the biases cited earlier) show that in 1998 corporations in Asia 
excluding Japan issued a paltry USD  222 million-equivalent of local currency bonds 
(Graph 2, with amounts converted at prevailing exchange rates). What is effectively a zero 
line for corporate, local currency issuance across the region continued through the 1997-98 
regional crisis. On the other hand, the same graph shows that there was some foreign 
currency issuance before the crisis, though it largely came from one entity: the Singapore-
headquartered Asia Pulp and Paper. By the end of 1998, total US dollar corporate issuance 
out of the region stood at USD 8.8 billion. 
Another way to think about this very skewed currency composition of debt issuance is that 
local currency bonds made up less than 2% of total corporate issuance before the Asian 
crisis and a mere 6% during the crisis period. So, the problem of Asia’s corporate, local 
currency bond markets before the regional financial crisis could not have been more basic - 
they almost did not exist but for a few examples in Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and possibly 
Korea. The obvious first step towards creating markets that could ameliorate the double 
mismatch of currency and duration was for the domestic, corporate bond markets to grow 
from their paltry size. 
Looking at the data, it is immediately apparent that the growth in the size and the shift in the 
composition of Asia’s corporate bond markets has been even more striking than those of 
Asia’s government bond markets. Since the Asian crisis, local currency bond issuance by 
corporations has soared: Graph 2 shows that, by 1999, corporate issuance in local currency 
surpassed that in US dollars, and since then the race has not been a contest. Total local 
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two years earlier. This is not to say that US dollar debt issuance from corporations has stood 
still since the crisis. Indeed, this asset class has expanded to such an extent that dedicated 
indices, such as the JPMorgan Asia Credit Index (JACI), have been developed as 
benchmarks for the investor base. Nevertheless, the growth story since the crisis is clearly in 
the local corporate bond markets, with over 70% of bonds in non-Japan Asia issued in 
domestic currencies since 1998 - a vast improvement from the single digit percentages cited 
earlier (Graph 3). 
Corporate issuance tends to mirror sovereign’s currency choices 
Just as we have seen in the case of Asian governments, Asian corporations vary in their 
choice of currency mix across economies. Like governments, Asia corporations in most of 
the 10 economies show a clear preference for issuing in their own currencies. Indeed, there 
is a striking similarity between government and corporate behaviour: the currency choice by 
corporations tends to closely mirror that of their respective sovereigns (Graph 4). 
For Thailand, Taiwan (China), India, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines, the choice of 
currency for bond issuance by sovereigns and corporations is very similar. At one extreme, 
Thai and Taiwanese firms effectively issue all of their debt in local currency (just like their 
sovereigns), while at the other extreme, Philippine firms raise most of their funding from the 
US dollar market (just like their sovereign).  
The exceptions are worth noting. Clearly, in the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
local multinational firms have a natural need for some US dollar funding. In addition, the fixed 
exchange rate policies of Hong Kong and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Singapore, create 
a natural tendency for firms to rely on US dollar financing. We would also recognise the 
biases of the BondWare data in the case of China, where corporate funding in renminbi may 
be a higher proportion than that shown if many issues occur “under the radar” in the sense 
that they are placed with local banks and are not accessible to investors generally. In 
addition, until recently, tax incentives actually encouraged Chinese issuers to borrow in US 
dollars. Finally, for Indonesia, note that the numbers in dollar terms are very small and that 
government issuance in local currencies has only just resumed, while small dollar issuance 
by corporations became possible only in 2002. 
This post-crisis transition to a preference for local currency funding by Asian corporations 
also varies across countries. To highlight the variation, Graphs 5 and 6 display the dollar 
amounts of domestic and foreign currency issuance by firms from Thailand and Singapore, 
respectively, from 1994 to 2003. In the case of Thailand, the switch was dramatic. Pre-crisis, 
the exchange rate stability, the interest rate premium on baht and other factors led Thai 
corporations to fund themselves in US dollars. That funding source evaporated during the 
crisis and since then almost all issuance has been in local currency, including substantial 
amounts issued to repay foreign currency-denominated debts. In the case of Singapore, the 
transition by firms was much more gradual and the outcome more balanced. Nevertheless, 
the pattern of increasing amounts of issuance in local currency is also apparent. 
Other characteristics of Asian corporate local bond issuance: maturity, 
size, sectors 
Along with overall market size, there are a host of other characteristics that are associated 
with a well functioning corporate bond market: issuance across the yield curve, large 
individual issuance size, and issuance from a variety of sectors, to name a few. We take a 
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amount of local currency issuance has clearly grown in many Asian countries, there are other 
dimensions in which this supply could still develop. 
Maturity: Graph 7 shows that the maturity of local currency corporate issuance is similar to 
that seen in government bonds. That is, corporate issuance in local currency is heavily 
skewed to the very short end. For issuance above five years, foreign currency bonds are 
favoured over local bonds. 
Size: Graph 8 shows that, in general, issuance in local currency tends to be done in smaller 
sized bonds. On average, issue size for local currency issuance is less than half that for 
foreign currency issuance. It should be noted that, over time, especially in the past two years, 
that size gap is narrowing. 
Sector: Graphs 9 and 10 show that, in both local and foreign currency bond markets, 
issuance from financials dominates. 
Prospects for the issuance of Asian local currency corporate bonds are 
bright 
So, the overall message regarding the supply of local currency corporate bonds in Asia is 
that the situation today is already very positive. Governments had taken the lead after the 
Asian crisis and corporates have followed. 
And the future of corporate bond supply looks even brighter. Simply looking at scheduled 
redemptions (Graph 11), reflecting the short-dated characteristic of local bonds pointed out 
above, there is more issuance in the pipeline. Once the stock of debt has been built up, as it 
has over the past several years, issuance tends to be perpetuated: supply begets more 
supply. 
Thoughts about the demand side of the market 
In closing, we turn our thoughts to the much-neglected demand side of the equation with 
respect to Asian corporate bond market development. In our view, the benefits of this fast-
growing local currency bond market that we have documented have not been spread evenly. 
Much attention has rightly been paid to the importance of building a primary bond market for 
Asia’s corporate issuers. But let us spare a moment to think about investors’ needs. Indeed, 
even though significant progress has been made on the supply front over the past several 
years, the constraint on developing Asian secondary bond markets looks likely to come from 
issues on the demand side. 
In general, the relationship between issuer and investors is not necessarily a zero-sum 
game. True, for each issue, a lower coupon benefits the issuer at the direct expense of the 
investor, but lower debt service costs for a firm reduce the likelihood of default, which 
benefits both. There is also a virtuous cycle in which the lower cost of capital reduces 
inflation pressures; lower inflation reduces financial volatility; lower volatility is rewarded 
through lower borrowing costs. Many of these factors have been at work in Asia. 
Another area of obvious benefit for both lenders and borrowers is the development of 
secondary market liquidity. Investors benefit from the flexibility of being able to transfer risk 
before maturity - they are prepared to pay a premium for this which then lowers the interest 
costs for issuers. However, a different kind of liquidity - the excess deposit liquidity in the 
Asian banking sector - already benefits issuers and, as such, the lack of secondary market 
liquidity is primarily disadvantaging investors. Indeed, the clearest benefits for issuers have 
come from more traditional demand side pressures: viz the excess liquidity in the region’s 134  BIS Papers No 30
 
banks (Graph 12). Comparing this increase in excess liquidity with the growth in issuance, it 
can be seen that issuers have benefited through the increased demand. 
The result has been a shrinking of credit spreads on Asian dollar bonds (Graph 13). While 
the exact determinants of this spread tightening are difficult to pin down, we would certainly 
attach significant importance to the excess liquidity in the banking sector that has prompted 
the so-called “Asian bid”. Whatever the causes, lower spreads have reduced the opportunity 
for investors to earn yield by taking credit exposure. 
Ideally, this imbalance should be corrected as new issuers enter the market and widen 
spreads. But the low yields have not enticed enough new entrants. One reason is that that 
the universe of issuers in Asia is very narrow and issuers lack diversity. Additionally, low 
bond yields have also had to compete with another form of capital-raising - equity financing. 
With a high demand for global diversity in equity portfolios and the low actual supply, Asian 
equities are arguably even more mispriced than credit spreads. Accordingly, firms find equity 
issuance more attractive than bond issuance. 
Investors, recognising the supply imbalance, have instead shifted the focus of their demand 
away from “plain vanilla” corporate issuance. As an alternative, investors have set their 
sights on structured products. Effectively, investors do not believe that current yields 
adequately compensate them for taking the credit risk entailed in buying corporate bonds 
and accepting the lack of secondary market liquidity. Instead, structured products which offer 
principal protection and leverage market risk (either yield curve shape or volatility), are 
perceived to offer a higher yield for the same liquidity constraints. In essence, structured 
products work through taking leveraged bets on observable market prices. 
Examples of structured products offered to Asian investors are now numerous: 
•  Convertible bonds: these pay coupons like a regular bond but the principal is 
redeemed in equity subject to the performance of the stock and at the discretion of 
the issuer. 
•  Cover call selling: the investor buys a standard bond but sells potential upside to 
lock in a higher up-front yield. 
•  “Quanto” structures: the principal is issued and redeemed in one currency but the 
coupon is indexed off another, higher-yielding, currency yield curve. 
•  Range accrual notes: these pay twice the current market coupon if an observable 
market interest rate stays been two agreed levels, but half the coupon if the interest 
rate moves outside the agreed range. 
•  Target redemption notes: these guarantee principal protection and a higher than 
market yield but the redemption date is not fixed at issuance. 
•  Collateralised debt obligations: these tier both the returns and the risks of standard 
bonds into low-risk and low-return tranches, on the one hand, and high-return, high-
risk tranches on the other, and may use derivative products to tailor characteristics 
to demand. 
A common trait across all of these products is that, so long as the investor holds it to 
maturity, the principal is protected. Of course, this is the same as with a standard bond, 
barring default. In contrast to the credit risk of direct lending to corporations, however, with 
market-linked structures the investor limits credit exposure to the default risk of the issuing or 
arranging banks and even this risk is sometimes reduced by a special-purpose vehicle that 
segregates the original capital. These products’ returns can also be guaranteed in the 
currency of the investor, meaning the risk of the currency mismatch between investor and 
issuer is borne by the arranger or passed onto the market. And, although structured products 
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and so could be considered more transparent than the domestic credit market, with its lack of 
market standards and, by global standards, poor disclosure. 
At this point it is worth discussing whether Asia is any worse off in the current situation: 
issuers fund cheaply in the credit market, investors in structured products have their principal 
protected and earn their target yield. The benefits of structured products are clear, they are 
tailored to meet both sides’ cash flow requirements subject to their return and risk profiles. 
Structured products can be designed to embody yield curve risk, option risk or direct credit 
risk, alone or in combination. Although the risks are more complex, they are not necessarily 
higher than the naked credit exposure of owning corporate paper. 
Tellingly, just as the demand for corporate bonds pushed down credit spreads, buying of 
structured products has flattened yield curves and lowered the premiums on financial 
options, so the attraction of earning income through structured products is waning compared 
with owning simple credit. Another concern is that, although we argued that credit spreads 
are too tight and do not compensate for the illiquidity (cost of transferring the risk to someone 
before maturity), structured products are even less liquid. A holder of a publicly tradable 
corporate bond can sell it to any other investor in the market. Due to the customised nature 
of structured products, the buyer’s recourse is to the original arranger, so the cost of 
unwinding is much more than even the wide bid-offer spread on Asia corporate paper. 
The other side of structured product buying is structured issuance. Similar to the zero-sum 
nature of setting a coupon for issuer and investor, a structured product issuer is taking the 
risks of intermediating between wholesale markets and buyers trying to achieve higher 
returns. However, taking advantage of this potentially much cheaper funding alternative 
requires from the issuer an appetite for risk and the sophistication to manage the yield curve, 
option or credit risks.
2 
And here is the kicker: regardless of what the threshold requirements of sophistication for 
issuers to participate in this market might be, at the moment fully understanding structured 
products appears beyond the scope of most Asian financial institutions. To date, only a 
handful, helped by foreign banks, have issued structured products. So, it is fair to say, 
structured products currently sold to Asian investors almost entirely benefit issuers 
headquartered outside Asia. This is obviously not the ideal case, and brings us back to the 
original problem of Asian savings exiting the region and Asian issuers being disadvantaged. 
An obvious solution to this might be to encourage the region’s institutions to issue their own 
structured products. Indeed, foreign expertise has already transferred pricing skills to the 
region’s banks, which have then used their networks to market structured products to their 
customers. But for all the merits of structured products, they do not represent the ideal 
solution. They are designed to be customised for counterparties, not commoditised for 
liquidity. Straight bonds are still needed for corporate benchmarking - as a derivative, some 
structured products are meant to derive their value from the very cash bonds that they are 
currently replacing. 
So, indeed, Asia corporate bond markets have come a long way. The primary market is now 
liquid and deep enough to cover most of the needs of the current issuer base. But 
imbalances, especially the excess liquidity in the banking sector, have benefited issuers, the 
supply side of the equation. In the future, the market’s success for issuers may be 
constrained by the costs to investors. Investors, seeking alternatives to raise yields, are 
increasingly turning away from standard corporate fixed income instruments and towards 
investments such as structured products. Clearly this is not ideal as, collectively, the myriad 
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risks involved are more complex than simple credit risks, and at the margin the benefits 
accrue to the structured product arrangers at the expense of both issuers and investors. 
Efforts are needed to restore the balance between supply and demand in Asia’s corporate 
bond markets, primarily now helping investors though increasing the diversity and scope of 
issuer alternatives. BIS Papers No 30  137
 
Chart 1 
Currency mix of government bonds 























Source: BondWare, December 2003. 
Chart 2 
Currency mix of corporate bonds 
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Chart 3 
Asian corporate issuance by currency 























Source: BondWare, December 2003. 
Chart 4 
Foreign currency mix of government and corporate bonds 
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Chart 5 
Thailand's switch to local financing 
was dramatic ... 
USD millions 
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Source: BondWare, December 2003. 
Chart 7 
Maturity structure of corporate bonds 
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Source: BondWare, December 2003. 
Chart 9 
Local currency issuance 
USD billions, 1998-2003 
Chart 10 
Foreign issuance 
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Chart 11 
























Measures of excess liquidity 






















1  Combined size of Asian central bank issuance to mop up excess liquidity. 

























































Source: BondWare, December 2003. 
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